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Working Paper Series No 600Abstract
This paper estimates a hybrid New Keynesian model on euro
area data and evaluates the performance of di⁄erent simple policy
rules and of the optimal unconstrained rule under commitment.
The study reaches two main conclusions. First, in￿ ation is found
to be mainly forward-looking in the euro area, which implies the
optimal policy reaction to cost push shocks is a muted one. Sec-
ond, a "speed limit" rule of the type recently proposed by Walsh
(2003) is able to closely approximate the performance of the op-
timal rule under commitment. The optimal speed limit rule is
also characterised by super-inertia, making it a ￿rst di⁄erence
rule similar to those recently proposed as a possible solution to
measurement problems in the level of the natural interest rate
and of potential output.
Keywords: Euro area, hybrid New Keynesian model, mone-





Working Paper Series No 600Non-technical summary 
 
This paper estimates a hybrid New Keynesian model on the euro area economy based on 
quarterly data over a sample period ranging between 1987 and 2004, which is considered 
to be representative of the situation prevailing since the introduction of the euro, in 
particular due to the low level and stationary behaviour of inflation during this period. 
The specification of the model is based on Rudebusch (2002), and features a backward-
looking IS curve, a hybrid Phillips curve, as well as expectational and transmission lags. 
A main finding of the empirical exercise is that inflation is mainly forward-looking in the 
euro area, broadly in line for example with Gali, Gertler and Lopez Salido (2001); hence 
intrinsic inflation persistence is found to be very low. 
 
Based on the model's estimated parameters, the unconstrained optimal policy rule under 
commitment is simulated. A second contribution of this article is to compare the 
performance of the optimal rule under commitment with that of some simple linear rules 
which have been proposed in the literature. This analysis reaches three main results: 
 
1.  Broadly consistent for example with Walsh (2003) and McCallum and Nelson 
(2004b) for the US economy, it is found that an optimized “speed limit” policy 
rule (i.e. a rule in which the interest rate reacts to the rate of change of the output 
gap, rather than to its level) closely tracks the performance of the unconstrained 
optimal rule under commitment against the background of the economy's 
parameters. Interestingly, the optimal speed limit policy rule can be approximated 
as the first difference of the nominal interest rate reacting to the rate of change in 
the output gap. This result is found to be relatively robust to possible reasonable 
changes in the parameters of the economy (in particular, the degree of forward-
lookingness in output) and in the central bank loss function.  
2.  The optimal speed limit policy features a negligible reaction to cost-push shocks, 
which reflects the fact that inflation has little intrinsic persistence in the estimated 
model of the euro area. The reaction to demand shocks, by contrast, is found to be 




Working Paper Series No 6003.  Finally, the optimal speed limit policy is, in the baseline exercise as well as in all 
the other considered variants, close to a first difference rule. In spite of this, the 
rule is able to deliver low interest rate volatility. 
 
This paper does not address the issue of the operationality of the rules in a context where 
the policy-maker is confronted with uncertainty (McCallum and Nelson, 1999). While 
developing this analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is notable that there is at 
least one important dimension of uncertainty, namely measurement error in the levels of 
the output gap and the natural interest rate. Measurement error might become a decisive 
argument in favour of policies based on targeting the rate of change in the output gap, 
rather than its level, from an operational perspective. It is particularly noteworthy that a 
policy rule such as the optimal SL rule identified in this paper, where the first difference 
in the nominal interest rate reacts to the first difference in the output gap, can alleviate 
measurement problems related to both the output gap and the natural interest rate, issues 
which have been prominent in the recent work of Orphanides (2003), Orphanides and 




Working Paper Series No 6001 Introduction
New Keynesian models have gained a central place in the study of
monetary policy in recent years (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999). A
distinctive feature of these models is the prominent role attributed to
forward-looking behaviour and private sector expectations, which makes
pre-commitment desirable in monetary policy-making (Woodford, 2003).
The advantages of commitment in monetary policy-making are clear.
Because in New Keynesian models today￿ s output and in￿ ation depend
on their expected future values, expectations of future policy matter
inasmuch as, if not more than, current policy decisions. However, while
there is wide agreement on the possible bene￿ts of commitment, there is
much less consensus on how to implement commitment, for example in
terms of targeting rules (advocated for example by Svensson, 2003) or
instrument rules (advocated by, among others, McCallum and Nelson,
2004a). As noted by Woodford (1999) and McCallum (1999), the opti-
mal way to carry out monetary policy under commitment is to follow a
highly history-dependent policy. Since, under commitment, this inertial
feature of the optimal rule feeds into private sector expectations and
hence (in a forward-looking model) current output and in￿ ation, a more
gradual and hence preferable adjustment is made possible in response to
shocks hitting the economy.
This study aims at shedding some light on this matter, with partic-
ular reference to a hybrid New Keynesian model estimated on the euro
area economy. The empirical model follows Rudebusch (2002) and in-
cludes a backward-looking IS curve and a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve. Based on the model￿ s estimated parameters, we compute the pol-
icy rule of the central bank which is the unconstrained optimal one
under commitment (optimal commitment rule).1 The central bank com-
mits itself to follow the same policy rule at all times, and this commit-
ment (which is assumed to be believed by the private sector) allows the
achievement of a better trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation, output and interest
rate stabilization. Because our model includes cost-push shocks and due
to the fact that interest rate volatility is penalized in the central bank
loss function, the optimal rule under commitment displays signi￿cant in-
ertia and history dependence. A ￿rst original contribution of this paper
is to derive the optimal rule under commitment against the background
of our estimated model of the euro area economy, and to evaluate its
performance.
1A recent paper by Adalid, Coenen, McAdam and Siviero (2005) analyses the
robustness of interest rate rules across four di⁄erent models of the euro area economy.
However, none of the models examined in that paper can be de￿ned, strictly speaking,
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of the optimal rule under commitment with that of some simple linear
rules which have been proposed in the literature. The advantage of sim-
ple rules over the fully optimal rule under commitment is their easier
interpretability, which may make them more useful guidelines for actual
policy-setting. On the other hand, one would ideally like to ensure that,
by following a simple rule, the central bank does not compromise too
much on its performance in terms of maximising its welfare criterion. We
consider three simple rules, which have gained some prominence in the
literature. The ￿rst is a simple Taylor rule without interest rate smooth-
ing, which should be expected not to have a particularly favourable per-
formance since it does not possess any history-dependence feature. The
next rule we consider is a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing, where
history-dependence is captured by the presence of the lagged nominal in-
terest rate in the rule.2 Finally, we consider a "speed limit" policy rule
of the type recently proposed by Walsh (2003) and McCallum and Nel-
son (2004b), which implies a policy reaction to the rate of change in the
output gap, rather than to its level. The coe¢ cients of the proposed
simple rules are all optimized within the class of rules, namely chosen so
as to maximize the central bank welfare criterion.
A main result of this study, which is broadly consistent with those of
Walsh (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (2004b) for the US economy, is
that an optimized speed limit policy rule closely tracks the performance
of the unconstrained optimal rule under commitment against the back-
ground of the economy￿ s parameters as estimated on euro area data.
Interestingly, the optimal speed limit policy rule can be approximated
as the ￿rst di⁄erence of the nominal interest rate reacting to the rate
of change in the output gap. It is thus interpretable as a rule in ￿rst
di⁄erences, which resembles the ￿rst di⁄erence rules recently proposed
for the US economy, albeit with di⁄erent motivation, by Orphanides and
Williams (2002) and Williams (2004). We also carry out some robust-
ness analysis of this result, ￿nding that this conclusion is qualitatively
maintained over a range of di⁄erent parameters in the central bank loss
function. Moreover, it is shown that the conclusions are also robust if one
assumes that the estimated, backward-looking IS curve is mis-speci￿ed
and that the true model of output is partly forward-looking.
The paper is structured as follows. We specify the hybrid New Key-
nesian model and discuss some issues related to optimal monetary policy
rules under commitment in Section 2. We estimate the model on euro
2This rule has been already considered for the euro area in Peersman and Smets
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2 Policy rules in a hybrid New Keynesian model
2.1 Model speci￿cation
It has become customary to estimate a hybrid version of a New Keyne-
sian (henceforth HNK) macroeconomic model of the euro area economy.
In this model, in￿ ation is determined in a Phillips curve equation con-
taining both a forward-looking and a backward-looking element (Gali
and Gertler, 1999). The hybrid model is normally found to have a better
empirical performance than a purely forward-looking one, and it encom-
passes the pure New Keynesian model as a special case on the basis of
a restriction which can be tested.3
Speci￿cally, the model is typically made of the following two equa-
tions: yt = ￿yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Etyt+1 + ￿b rt + "
y
t; (1)
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿t+1 + kyt + "
￿
t ; (2)
where y is the output gap, b r is the deviation of the real interest rate
from its equilibrium level (i.e. the real interest rate gap), ￿ is the devia-




a demand and a cost-push i.i.d. shock (for example, the cost-push shock
is a mark-up shock as explained by Steinsson, 2003) with standard devi-
ations ￿y and ￿￿. We also assume, in line with the literature (Amato and
Laubach, 2004) that the two shocks are uncorrelated with each other.
The parameters ￿ and ￿ are those determining the degree of inertia in
the model. If ￿ = ￿ = 0; the model is completely forward-looking, while
the opposite holds true if ￿ = ￿ = 1:
2.2 Optimal interest rate rules under commitment
The emphasis given to private sector forward-looking behaviour in New
Keynesian models in the determination of output and in￿ ation highlights
the bene￿ts which can be reaped through commitment by the central
bank to a monetary policy rule. In fact, output and in￿ ation today are
determined not only ￿or even not mainly ￿by current policy actions, but
also ￿and perhaps primarily ￿by the expectation of the future conduct
of policy (Woodford, 2003). In other words, commitment to a policy
rule is a means by which a policy maker can steer the expectations of
3Several papers have attempted at providing microfoundations to the presence
of backward-looking behaviour in the model. These include, for example, explana-
tions based on habit formation (Fuhrer, 2000), rule of thumb behaviour (Amato and
Laubach, 2004) and price indexation (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001).




Working Paper Series No 600the private sector in a direction which is most useful for stabilization
purposes.
Let us assume, in line with the literature, that the model in (1)-(2)
describes the structure of the economy and that the central bank wishes
















where b it = b rt + Et￿t+1 is the deviation of the nominal interest rate
from its steady state level, and 0 < ￿ < 1 is a discount factor. Wood-
ford (2003) has shown that the loss function in (3) is consistent with
the maximization of a social utility function, because it contributes to
undoing the distortions in the economy due to the existence of monop-
olistic competition and sluggish price adjustment.4 In this loss function
we are assuming that the central bank is also concerned with deviations
of the nominal interest rate from the steady state, for example due to
￿nancial stability considerations and in order to minimize the risk of the
nominal interest rate hitting the zero bound on nominal interest rates
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1998).
Assuming that there is agreement about the bene￿ts of commitment
in monetary policy, the important question becomes: how should com-
mitment be implemented by the monetary authority? A simple way sug-
gested in the literature has been that the central bank should systemati-
cally follow a Taylor-type rule which ensures a determinate solution, i.e.
consistent with the Taylor principle (Taylor, 1999). However, Woodford
(1999, 2003) and McCallum (1999) have shown that there is an optimal
target criterion for the central bank which ensures the minimization of
a loss function as in (3) (albeit not including a term penalizing interest
rate volatility) under the constraint given by the structure of the econ-
omy in (1) and (2), which deviates from the targeting criterion implicit
in an optimal rule under discretion. In a model without in￿ ation inertia





(yt ￿ yt￿1) = 0 (4)
4It should be noted that in the presence of in￿ ation inertia, the target in￿ ation
rate should also depend on the recent past rate of in￿ation, unlike in the more com-
mon case in which in￿ ation is entirely forward-looking (Clarida, Gali and Gertler,
1999). We leave this complication aside in the analysis, since the loss function in (3)
continues to be valid if one substitutes the in￿ ation rate with its quasi-di⁄erenced
level (see Woodford, 2003, and Amato and Laubach, 2004). Moreover, if ￿ is low
(and we ￿nd this to be the case later on when estimating the model on euro area
data) then in￿ ation and quasi-di⁄erenced in￿ ation will be very strongly correlated.
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sponses to demand and cost push disturbances regardless of the assumed
statistical properties of the disturbances. This optimal target criterion





yt = 0 (5)
The key point to emphasize here is that, in the optimal targeting
criterion, it is the rate of change in the output gap, rather than its level,
that should determine the acceptable deviation of in￿ ation from the long
run in￿ ation target. This holds irrespective of the fact that it is the level
of the output gap which enters the central bank loss function in (3), and
which contributes to creating in￿ ationary pressure (see eq. (2)).
The feature of the optimal targeting criterion in (4) which improves
on the more common targeting criterion in (5) is its history-dependence.
It is in fact immediate to see that the optimal targeting criterion depends
not only on variables dated t, as the alternative targeting criterion in
(5), but also on the output gap dated t ￿ 1. The usefulness of this
commitment to follow a history-dependent monetary policy rule is im-
mediately evident when considering the reaction of the economy to an
adverse cost-push shock.
The focus in this paper is the implementation of the targeting cri-
terion in (4) by means of instrument rules. Notably, McCallum and
Nelson (2004b) report that an instrument rule reacting very strongly to
deviations of output and in￿ ation from the targeting criterion in (4) can
represent a very good approximation to an optimal targeting rule. The
rule proposed by McCallum and Nelson (2004b) is:
b it = ￿2b it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿1[￿t +
￿y
k
(yt ￿ yt￿1)]; (6)
where ￿2 > 0 is the speed of partial adjustment parameter and ￿1 > 0
the feedback parameter. If the latter coe¢ cient is very large (feedback
is very strong), a good approximation to the optimal targeting rule can
be achieved.
In practice, the main concern in devising an instrument rule as in (6)
is the risk that it might create excessive interest rate volatility. McCal-
lum and Nelson (2004a), however, ￿nd this concern unfounded since, in
equilibrium, a strong reaction does not necessarily imply paying a high
cost in terms of interest rate volatility, because the movements in output
recently demonstrated that there is a target criterion which can deliver a lower level
of the loss than the one shown here. However, the di⁄erence is likely to be very small,
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small under the proposed rule. McCallum and Nelson highlight that an
instrument rule involving feedback from the targeting criterion in (4)
and with some concern for interest rate smoothing (for example includ-
ing partial adjustment) is likely to approximate the optimal targeting
rule quite well.
Against this background, the main objective of this paper is to evalu-
ate how well simple policy rules with interest rate smoothing perform in
comparison with the unconstrained optimal instrument rule. In particu-
lar, we will evaluate the performance of four di⁄erent types of rules. The
￿rst one is the unconstrained optimal rule under commitment, which we
denote the "OC rule" in the continuation. This rule has, by de￿nition,
the best possible performance in terms of central bank loss, and the fo-
cus of the analysis will thus be on how much would be lost if the central
bank decided to follow simple constrained interest rate rules, compared
with the ￿rst best.
The ￿rst simple rule that we consider is the TS rule:
b it = ’ib it￿1 + ’￿￿t + ’yyt (7)
namely a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. Next, we analyse
a simple "speed limit" (SL) policy rule which is de￿ned as follows:
b it = ’ib it￿1 + ’￿￿t + ’y(yt ￿ yt￿1) (8)
This rule involves feedback from the rate of change in the output gap,
rather than from its level as in the policy rule in (7). Walsh (2003)
de￿nes the targeting criterion in (4), the deviations from which the rule
in (8) reacts to, as a "speed limit" one. Walsh ￿nds that aiming at this
targeting criterion, albeit under discretion, leads to a good performance
in terms of central bank loss in models of the US economy, so it is an
interesting question to check whether the same concept holds true for a
model of the euro area economy and under commitment. Moreover, the
SL rule corresponds, in practice, to the feedback rule proposed by Mc-
Callum and Nelson (2004b) and which is found to well approximate the
performance of the optimal unconstrained instrument rule in a variety
of models.
Finally, for the sake of completeness we also analyse a simple Taylor
rule without interest rate smoothing (T rule),
b it = ’￿￿t + ’yEtyt (9)
We evaluate the performance of this rule in terms of average loss for
the central bank given the loss function postulated in (3), against the
background of an estimated hybrid New Keynesian model of the euro
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In this section we estimate an slightly di⁄erent version of the hybrid
New Keynesian model, in order to take into accounts transmission and
expectational lags, closely following the Rudebusch (2002) model of the
US economy.
The empirical model is speci￿ed as follows:
yt = ￿1yt￿1 + ￿2yt￿2 ￿ ￿(it￿1 ￿ Et￿1￿t+3 ￿ rt￿1) + "
y
t (10)
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿1￿t+3 + kyt￿1 + "
￿
t (11)
where y is a measure of the output gap, i is the short-term nom-
inal interest rate, ￿ is the annualised percentage changes in the price
level, Et￿1￿t+3 is a survey-based measure of average in￿ ation over the
subsequent four quarters, lagged one quarter, rt is the time-varying
equilibrium rate of interest, and "
y
t and "￿
t are i.i.d. shocks.
Some observations on this speci￿cation are in order. The IS curve is
backward-looking; this re￿ ects the empirical problems associated with
estimating a forward-looking IS curve, as documented in Fuhrer and
Rudebusch (2004), which are also con￿rmed in preliminary analysis on
the euro area data used in this paper. The model features a lag in the
transmission of monetary policy in equation (10), and an expectational
lag in the Phillips curve (see Rudebusch, 2002, for further details). An
important advantage of Rudebusch￿ s speci￿cation is that the model can
be estimated by OLS.
The estimation is based on quarterly euro area data from 1987:Q1
to 2004:Q4 (72 usable quarterly observations).6 The choice of the sam-
ple period is important to ensure stability of the estimated parameters.
The main purpose of this study, in fact, is to evaluate policy rules which
may be optimal in the context of the environment prevailing after the
introduction of the euro, and therein lies the policy-relevant content of
the analysis. It is therefore of paramount importance to ensure that
the data come from a sample period which is as close as possible, es-
pecially in terms of the monetary policy regime and its credibility, to
the one currently prevailing in the euro area. Although the hybrid New
Keynesian model is in principle construed to be policy-invariant, there
are nevertheless certain features of the model (such as, notably, the de-
gree of in￿ ation persistence) which might not, as a matter of fact, have
this desirable property (Erceg and Levin, 2003). Euro area in￿ ation ap-
pears to be a stationary variable (see below) starting after the second oil
6The source for all the data is the ECB￿ s area wide model, apart from in￿ ation




Working Paper Series No 600counter-shock (in 1986), but is a non-stationary variable if one extends
the sample back to the early 1980s. The stationarity of in￿ ation after
the oil counter-shock is a quite convincing indication that the post-1986
sample can be used to estimate parameters which are immune from the
Lucas critique. The empirical evidence appears to con￿rm that this is
indeed the case, as will be described shortly.
Turning to the data, in￿ ation is the annualised quarterly change in
the GDP de￿ ator. As a measure of the in￿ ation expectations over the
following year, data from the European Commission Consumer Survey
are used.7 Since the model in (10)-(11) requires variables to be station-
ary, some de-trending is required. According to standard unit root tests,
the in￿ ation rate and the measure of in￿ ation expectations are station-
ary, while the log of real GDP and the real interest rate, rt = it￿Et￿t+4,
are trending variables. We de-trend the real interest rate by applying
the HP ￿lter, in order to control for a secular decline in its level, which
re￿ ects the trend decline in population and total factor productivity
growth experienced in the euro area in the last two decades (see ECB,
2004).8 As far as the euro area output gap is concerned, the "common
cycle" measure of Proietti, Musso, and Westermann (2002) is used, an
indicator which is derived using a production function approach. As
documented by Proietti, Musso and Westermann (2002), this indicator
comes out very well from speci￿cation tests as well as an explanatory
variable for euro area in￿ ation, which is arguably a feature that any good
measure of the euro area output gap should have.
























= 0:44; DW = 2:04; ￿2
￿ = 0:94
7Speci￿cally, the question on price trends over the following 12 months is converted
into a quantitative measure using the approach suggested by Forsells and Kenny
(2002).
8Applying a linear trend for de-trending the real interest rate leads to similar
results, but to a somewhat poorer ￿t in the IS equation.
9In the Phillips curve equation we impose that the sum of the coe¢ cients for
past in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations sum to one, as in Rudebusch (2002), after
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well speci￿ed and stable. The coe¢ cients have the expected sign and
are (with the exception of the coe¢ cient on past in￿ ation) all signi￿cant
at the 5% level or more. One important consideration in evaluating
this speci￿cation is, in particular, stability, given the change in regime
related to the introduction of the euro. To evaluate this crucial property
of the model, we run Chow out-of-sample forecasts tests at various dates
around the ￿rst quarter of 1999 (the date of the introduction of the
euro), ￿nding no evidence of a rejection of the null of stability. We also
break the sample period in two equivalent parts ￿before and after the
mid 1990s ￿and run breakpoint Chow parameter stability tests, again
￿nding no rejection of the null.
It is interesting to compare the estimated coe¢ cients with those re-
ported by Rudebusch (2002). As regards the Phillips curve, one main
di⁄erence with Rudebusch￿ s results is that in￿ ation is found to be much
more forward-looking on the euro area data. This is likely to re￿ ect more
the di⁄erent sample period (starting in 1968 in Rudebusch￿ s analysis,
thus covering the high in￿ ation period in the 1970s, in 1987 in this pa-
per) than a di⁄erence between the euro area and the US as such.10 For
the IS curve, the high degree of persistence of the output gap is simi-
lar to the results in Rudebusch (2002), while the estimated impact of a
change in the real interest rate gap is found to be larger, although still
in line with values which are considered appropriate for a large, closed
economy like the euro area.11
A main lesson which can be drawn from the estimation of the Rude-
busch (2002) model on euro area data is that in￿ ation has little intrinsic
persistence, while output is a very persistent process. This implies that
demand shocks have a more protracted e⁄ect on output and in￿ ation,
despite their smaller average size, than cost-push shocks, also taking
into account transmission lags. This intuitive consideration will soon
￿nd con￿rmation in the analysis of optimal policy rules based on this
model, which assign a more important role to demand shocks than to
cost push shocks.
For robustness analysis, we also use the HNK model estimated by
Smets (2003), which, to the author￿ s knowledge, is the only other avail-
able model of the same type estimated on euro area data which can be
10Smets (2003), working on euro area data as from 1970, also ￿nds a more back-
ward looking behaviour of in￿ ation. This con￿rms that the estimated high degree of
forward-lookingness of in￿ ation found in this paper probably hinges on the choice of
the sample period. See also ECB (2005) on the low intrinsic in￿ ation inertia in the
euro area in the current monetary policy regime.
11See for example Neiss and Nelson (2003) in general terms, and Rabanal and
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model is estimated in the speci￿cation shown in (1)-(2), using GMM, on
annual data ranging between 1970 and 1998. The estimated parameters
are ￿ = 0:44; ￿ = 0:48; ￿ = ￿0:06; k = 0:18, ￿y = 0:65; ￿￿ = 0:70:
4 Policy rules in the euro area
Against the background of the hybrid New Keynesian model of the euro
area estimated in the previous section, we solve the model for the optimal
feedback rule for the central bank, which is now a quite standard exercise
in the literature (on European data see, for example, Peersman and
Smets, 1999 and Ehrmann and Smets, 2003; more generally, see the
contributions in the volume by Taylor, 1999).
As to the parameters of the central bank loss function in (3), we
assume ￿￿ = 1
2; ￿x = ￿i = 1
4. In our interpretation, this is the loss
function of a "conservative" central bank which places more weight to
in￿ ation stability than on output and interest rate stability, which might
be considered appropriate given the supremacy of price stability as key
objective of monetary policy in the euro area. The weight placed on in-
terest rate stabilization is 1
4, the same value as, for example, in Peersman
and Smets (1999) and close to the value recommended by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) as being optimal so as to minimize the risk that the
nominal interest rate hits the zero bound. It should be noted that the
higher weight on in￿ ation volatility also caters for the presence of a lim-
ited degree of in￿ ation inertia in the model, as discussed by Amato and
Laubach (2004).
The central bank decision problem is essentially to choose b i so as to
minimize the loss in (3) under the constraint given by the structure of
the economy. In the sequel, we consider four possible types of policy
rules, namely the OC, TS, SL and T rules as described in Section 2.
4.1 The performance of optimal policy rules
We now turn to the concrete identi￿cation of the optimal rules in the
estimated model of the euro area, i.e. equations (12) and (13). Moreover,
the shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. and uncorrelated with each other.
We also use alternative parameter estimates, notably those obtained by
Smets (2003) for the euro area, for a robustness check of some of the
results.
All computations are done using the DYNARE software in MATLAB
(see Collard and Juillard, 2003). The OC rule is identi￿ed by means of
the OLR algorithm in DYNARE.12 The parameters of the optimal simple
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ensure a determinate solution, also performed in MATLAB (using the
OSR algorithm in DYNARE). In particular, for each triple f’i; ’￿; ’yg
within the determinacy range, we compute and record the loss for the
central bank. The optimal f’i; ’￿; ’yg is then simply identi￿ed as the
one for which the computed loss is smallest.
Table I reports the coe¢ cients f’i; ’￿; ’yg for each of the four
considered rules (where relevant), the variance of the variables which
enter the central bank loss function (in￿ ation, the output gap and the
nominal interest rate) and the per-period value of the loss function.
mality, not the optimality condition at the inception of the regime. In this sense the
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OC rule TS rule SL rule T rule
’￿ / 0.97 ’0 1
’y / 1.47 1.70 1.49
’i / 0.03 1 /
￿2
￿ 1.36 1.41 1.41 1.41
￿2
i 2.15 5.43 2.43 5.41
￿2
y 0.67 1.05 0.84 1.04
Loss per period 1.39 2.33 1.53 2.31
Note: Baseline exercise conducted under the assumption that the true model of
the economy is given by eq. (12) and (13). The loss per period is in percentage
points per quarter.
Predictably, the best performance in terms of loss is given by the OC
rule, while the T and TS rules have the worst performance. It is also
interesting to note that the optimal TS rule is found to have a very low
degree of inertia (in fact, it is very close to the optimal T rule). This is
likely to re￿ ect the very high estimated persistence of the output gap,
from which it feedbacks very strongly, which appears to be su¢ cient
to impart a high degree of inertial behaviour to the rule. The optimal
SL rule, by contrast, which reacts (again strongly) to the less persistent
changes in the output gap, is found to be very persistent, as it can be
speci￿ed as a rule in ￿rst di⁄erence. It needs to be emphasised that
for both rules the reaction to the output gap is signi￿cantly stronger
than that to in￿ ation; this is related to the fact that while the estimated
output process is a highly persistent one, the degree of in￿ ation inertia,
￿, has been estimated to be quite low. Hence, it is optimal for policy
not to react strongly to cost-push shocks, given the transmission lags.
Perhaps the most interesting message coming out of this analysis is
the comparison of the central bank loss (last row in the table). While
the performance of the optimal TS and T rules is somewhat worse than
that of the OC rule, that of the SL rule approximates that of the OC
rule signi￿cantly more closely. This con￿rms the conclusion reached by
McCallum and Nelson (2004b) about the desirability of SL instrument
rules under commitment in New Keynesian models of the type estimated
in this paper.
Further insight may be gained by looking at the impulse responses
following a demand and cost push shock for each of the considered policy
rules, shown in Fig. 1 (demand shock) and Fig. 2 (cost-push shock).
Following a positive demand shock, it is interesting to note that, un-
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the shock has waned (Fig. 1). This inertial behaviour helps containing
in￿ ationary pressure almost immediately, due to the fact that (in the
model) in￿ ation is forward-looking. It is also noteworthy that the im-
pulse responses of the SL rule are always very close to those of the OC
rule, suggesting that the former almost replicates the latter. Finally,
the policy reaction to a demand shock is relatively strong under all the
considered rules; this, again, re￿ ects the fact that output is found to be
a very persistent process in the empirical analysis.
Turning to the impact of a cost-push shock (Fig. 2), also in this case
under the history-dependent (OC and SL) rules a prolonged (if small)
contraction of output delivers a better stabilization of in￿ ationary pres-
sure, working through private sector expectations. An interesting di⁄er-
ence is visible in the interest rate reaction to the cost push shock which,
although muted in all cases, is signi￿cantly stronger and quicker under
the T and TS rules, while under the OC and SL rules it is signi￿cantly
more gradual. Also in this case the behaviour of the variables of the SL
rule follow that prevailing under the OC rule, which is a con￿rmation
that this simple rule is able to mimic the optimal unconstrained rule
very closely.
Another notable feature of the SL rule is that, despite its being very
persistent, it is able to produce a relatively low volatility in the nominal
interest rate. This is in keeping with McCallum and Nelson (2004b)￿ s
view that an instrument rule reacting strongly to deviations from the
optimal targeting criterion in (4) does not produce unnecessarily high
￿ uctuations in the nominal interest rate, given its strong stabilizing im-
pact on in￿ ation and the output gap.
The optimal SL rule can be expressed as a ￿rst di⁄erence rule reacting
to deviations of in￿ ation levels from the steady state level and from the
rate of change in the output gap:
￿b it = ’￿￿t + ’y￿yt (14)
In the baseline case reported in Table I, the optimal parameters of this
rule are ’￿ ’ 0 and ’y = 1:70.13 It is notable that this result has been
obtained without any assumption of uncertainty about the level of the
natural interest rate and of potential output, which are factors that have
been shown to support policy rules speci￿ed in ￿rst di⁄erences.
When repeating the analysis of the relative performance of the dif-
ferent policy rules based on the parameter estimates of Smets (2003), we
come to a slightly di⁄erent conclusion since the performance of the TS
13Note that, in order to ensure the determinacy of the equilibrium, ’￿ cannot be




Working Paper Series No 600Figure 1 – Impulse responses to a one standard deviation demand shock under 




































































Working Paper Series No 600Figure 2 – Impulse responses to a one standard deviation cost push shock under 




































































Working Paper Series No 600rule is slightly better than that of the SL rule (see Table II).14 Both rules,
however, still approach the performance of the OC rule very closely, so
our conclusion as regards the desirability of the SL rule is not funda-
mentally altered. In addition, it is interesting to note that the optimal
SL rule (second column from the right in Table II) is close to a nominal
income targeting rule, since ’￿ and ’y are very close. Intuitively, this
re￿ ects the higher in￿ ation persistence estimated by Smets (2003), which
creates the need for policy to react more strongly to cost-push shocks.
Similar conclusions can be reached also when changing the parame-
ters of the central bank loss function, as partly explained in the next
section. It appears, therefore, that the favourable performance of the
simple rules (and in particular of the SL rule) is relatively una⁄ected by
the speci￿c structural parameters used in the analysis.
Table II ￿Performance indicators of alternative policy rules
OC rule TS rule SL rule T rule
’i / 1.03 1.07 /
’￿ / 0.31 0.41 1.83
’y / 0.19 0.37 -0.31
￿2
i 1.75 1.75 1.84 10.58
￿2
￿ 2.49 2.54 2.62 3.35
￿2
y 2.19 2.19 2.56 2.31
Loss per period 2.23 2.25 2.41 4.90
Note: The simulation is conducted under the model parameters estimated by
Smets (2003): in the model (1)-(2), with ￿ = 0:44; ￿ = 0:48; ￿ = ￿0:06;
k = 0:18, ￿y = 0:65; ￿￿ = 0:70:
4.2 Some robustness analysis
In this section we carry out some robustness analysis of the key results of
the paper. The outcome of the analysis is reported in Table III below. In
particular, we consider two variants of the baseline speci￿cation. First,
we change the model of the economy in order to allow for forward-looking
output. Second, we change the parameters of the central bank loss
14The absolute levels of the variances and the central bank loss are remarkably
higher than in the baseline case. This is due to the low absolute level of ￿ estimated
in Smets (2003), which forces the central bank to move the nominal interest rate
much more than in the baseline case, which is costly for the monetary authority.
Note that our exercise is not directly comparable to that by Ehrmann and Smets
(2003), who use the same parameter values, since Ehrmann and Smets assume a
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optimal SL rule.
In fact, one possible caveat to the analysis conducted thus far is that
the estimated IS curve in (12) is a backward-looking one, while output in
the baseline hybrid New Keynesian model features (in (1)-(2)) should be
at least partly forward looking. While this simpli￿cation seems necessary
in order to estimate a well speci￿ed model on euro area data, it begs the
question of whether the results of the previous section are due to this
assumption, and are not valid otherwise.
Therefore, we repeat the analysis reported in Table I by assuming
that, in the IS equation in (12), the output gap is forward-looking with
a coe¢ cient of 0:5, and backward-looking with an equal weight. The





The results of this simulation are reported in the ￿rst four columns
to the left in Table III. Overall, assuming that output is partly forward-
looking does not change the main conclusions of the analysis. In fact, the
SL rule continues to approximate the OC rule very closely, although the
TS rule now also has almost the same performance. Moreover, it con-
tinues to be valid that the optimal SL rule is a ￿rst di⁄erence rule, with
a negligible feedback from in￿ ation and a comparatively stronger (even
if smaller compared with the baseline case) feedback from the output
gap. This analysis also con￿rms that the backward-looking speci￿cation
of the model in (12)-(13) does not, in itself, determine most of the main
results of this paper.
Another interesting question is whether the key features of the SL
rule are a⁄ected by the value of the parameters in the central bank
loss function. Two polar cases are considered here. First, an "in￿ ation
nutter" central bank attaching no weight to output gap stabilization
(￿y = 0; ￿￿ = 1); second, a "liberal" central bank attaching the same
weight to in￿ ation and output gap stabilization (￿y = ￿￿ = 0:5). The
outcome of this sensitivity analysis, also reported in Table III, indicates
that the optimal SL rule is relatively close to the baseline case in the
two other variants, suggesting that the relative weights of the output
gap and in￿ ation in the loss function do not matter too much for its
overall performance. Moreover, in these variants the performance of the
optimal SL rule continues to approximate the OC rule very well as in the
baseline case. Hence, the parameters in the central bank loss function




Working Paper Series No 600Table III ￿Performance indicators of alternative policy rules:
robustness analysis
Variant (1) (2) (3)
Rule OC TS SL T SL OC SL OC
’￿ / 0.07 ’0 1 ’0 / ’0 /
’y / 0.37 0.64 1.07 1.82 / 1.35 /
’i / 0.93 1 / 1 / 1 /
￿2
￿ 1.09 1.12 1.14 1.08 1.37 1.29 1.33 1.30
￿2
i 0.25 0.19 0.23 1.53 2.60 2.35 2.77 2.39
￿2
y 0.55 0.73 0.56 0.60 0.78 0.64 0.73 0.58
Loss 0.75 0.79 0.77 1.07 2.02 1.88 1.72 1.54
Note: Variant (1) is partly forward-looking output as in equation (15); variant
(2) is where the output gap does not appear in the loss function (￿y = 0; ￿￿ = 1,
i.e. "in￿ ation nutter"); variant (3) is where in￿ ation and the output gap receive the
same weight (i.e. ￿y = ￿￿ = 0:5, i.e. a "liberal" central bank).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have estimated a hybrid New Keynesian model of the
euro area economy based on quarterly data over a sample period ranging
between 1987 and 2004. The speci￿cation of the model is based on
Rudebusch (2002). A main ￿nding of this empirical exercise is that
in￿ ation is mainly forward-looking in the euro area, broadly in line for
example with Gali, Gertler and Lopez Salido (2001).
The importance of the forward-looking component in the euro area
Phillips curve makes commitment desirable in monetary policy. The key
question is really how to implement commitment, and this has been the
main focus of this paper. In particular, we have sought to compare the
performance of three simple interest rate rules with the unconstrained
optimal rule implemented under commitment against the background of
parameter estimates of the model which may be realistic for the euro
area economy.
The main conclusions of this article are three. First, a speed limit
policy (namely, a rule where the nominal interest rate reacts to the ￿rst
di⁄erence in the output gap) appears to have very favourable properties
from the standpoint of matching the performance of the optimal rule
under commitment. This result is found to be relatively robust to possi-
ble reasonable changes in the parameters of the economy (in particular,
the degree of forward-lookingness in output) and in the central bank
loss function. Second, the optimal speed limit policy features a negli-
gible reaction to cost-push shocks, which re￿ ects the fact that in￿ ation
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by contrast, is found to be strong, re￿ ecting the high estimated persis-
tence of the output gap. Third, the optimal speed limit policy is, in the
baseline exercise as well as in all the other considered variants, slightly
super-intertial and hence close to a ￿rst di⁄erence rule.
An important issue which this paper has not addressed is that of
the operationality of the rules in a context where the policy-maker is
confronted with uncertainty (McCallum and Nelson, 1999). While de-
veloping this analysis goes beyond the limited ambitions of this paper,
we note that there is at least one important dimension of uncertainty,
namely measurement error in the levels of the output gap and the natural
interest rate. This point of view is mentioned only in passing by Walsh
(2003) in his discussion of the desirability of the "speed limit policies",
but it is clear that measurement error might become a decisive argu-
ment in favour of policies based on targeting the rate of change in the
output gap, rather than its level, from an operational perspective.15 It
is particularly noteworthy that a policy rule such as the optimal SL rule
identi￿ed in this paper, where the ￿rst di⁄erence in the nominal interest
rate reacts to the ￿rst di⁄erence in the output gap, can alleviate measure-
ment problems related to both the output gap and the natural interest
rate, issues which have been prominent in the recent work of Orphanides
(2003), Orphanides and Williams (2002) and Williams (2004).
All in all, our ￿ndings bode well for the desirability and the opera-
tionality of a ￿rst di⁄erence speed limit monetary policy rule in the euro
area. Yet a ￿nal word of caution is in order, since this simple rule has
been found to be very close to the optimal one only under the simple
structure of the hybrid New Keynesian model estimated in this paper.
While this is a standard exercise in the literature, there is no guarantee
that the good performance would be maintained under a richer model
of the economy, for example including ￿nancial frictions. Assessing the
robustness of the performance of the rule to changes in the speci￿cation
of the model is an important task for future research.
15Indeed, Walsh (2003) argues that the Fed is already following a policy which can
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